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De-emphasizing Competition in Organized 
Youth Sport: Misdirected Reforms 
and Misled Children
Cesar R. Torres and Peter F. Hager 
Throughout the twentieth century, organized youth sport became an increas-
ingly prevalent childhood experience across Western societies—especially in 
affluent ones. Millions of children participate in organized sport each year. Partici-
pation is accepted and encouraged as an integral part of children’s lives because 
of its alleged benefits. Arguably, the goal of organized youth sport is to foster 
children’s overall welfare. Competition has played a prominent and sometimes 
controversial role in programs espousing this objective. It is precisely through the 
organization and administration of competitive sports that youth sport programs 
seek to advance their goal. However, the growing emphasis on winning, as well 
as the myriad of excesses and abuses that it has created among parents, coaches, 
spectators, and young athletes, has generated a massive wave of criticism against 
competition (6;7;11;26;33;37). Many professional organizations, advocacy groups, 
and experts in the field believe that organized youth sport programs are in crisis 
and have recommended reforms designed to establish a healthy environment that 
emphasizes children’s needs and interests first, so they can make the most of their 
sport experiences.
To ensure this, those who advocate the refocusing of organized youth sport 
maintain that these programs should “emphasize that there should be action, [and] 
involvement among all participants” and that adults “need to encourage fun” (6: p. 
147; 33). The gist of their proposals is to reprioritize the values inspiring participa-
tion in organized youth sport, which necessitates moving away from organizational 
models that mimic adult-oriented priorities. While confessedly de-emphasizing 
competition, the recommendations to emphasize action and fun have led organizers 
and administrators to discourage the formation of regular competitive teams and 
the keeping of scores or standings, to limit traveling outside the community, and to 
ensure minimal playing time for all young athletes. This set of recommendations 
and measures constitutes a growing trend in organized youth sport programs—a 
trend through which programs purport to underscore children’s interests and welfare 
over competitive performance and outcomes.
In this essay, we argue that this trend in organized youth sport is unwarranted 
and misleading to children. We believe that when children are initiated into such 
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“reformed” programs, they are deluded about the structure, central purpose, and 
value of participation in competitive sport. We begin by exploring details concerning 
the reformist movement, then analyze it under the two most common representa-
tions of the central purpose of competitive sport. The first is the “zero-sum” view, 
which focuses on establishing winners and losers; the second is the “mutualist” 
view, which focuses on the determination and construction of excellence in sport. 
This analysis not only demonstrates that the trend of de-emphasizing competition 
in youth sports is incompatible with these representations but also that it is mis-
leading to children. Finally, we show why misleading children in this way fails to 
serve their interests and needs and suggest a new direction for reform that, while 
keeping children’s welfare at the forefront, accurately represents the central purpose 
of competitive sport.
1
The trend toward removing competitive elements from youth sport programs 
(the trend hereafter) has its origins in the calls for reform issued by many parents, 
coaches, administrators, former youth sport athletes, and scholars over the last 25 
years. During this period, individuals and groups concerned with the well-being and 
development of children have expressed their displeasure with parents, coaches, and 
administrators who have emphasized winning and performance over values such as 
skill acquisition and mastery, fair play, sportspersonship, and fun. The proponents, 
as we will refer to them, have sought a reprioritization of these value sets that they 
believe will allow children to learn sport skills in a fun, fair, and developmentally 
appropriate environment.
To facilitate the development of such an atmosphere, the proponents believe it 
is necessary to de-emphasize or subtract certain competitive elements from youth 
sport contests and programs. For instance, the National Alliance for Youth Sport 
(NAYS) has established standards designed to create and maintain programs that 
put the development and well-being of children first. These standards call for youth 
sport leagues to commit to practices that decrease competition between teams 
and individuals or to altogether remove aspects of sport that promote competition 
between them.
NAYS Standards 1 (Proper Sports Environment) and 2 (Programs Based on 
the Well-Being of Children) best exemplify the Alliance’s approach to competi-
tiveness. Implementation guidelines for Standard 1 state that leagues should set 
minimum play requirements for participants, establish a no-cut policy, and “provide 
an opportunity for meaningful play for all children” (33). Similarly, implementa-
tion guidelines for Standard 2 proscribe the establishment of formal competitive 
teams prior to age 9. They also state that scores and standings should not be kept 
at the 5- to 6-year-old and 7- to 8-year-old levels and that standings should be de-
emphasized once scorekeeping begins at age 9. Postseason play is not allowed until 
children reach the 9- to 10-year-old age bracket, and even then it is to be limited to 
local or community play. Finally, Standard 2’s implementation procedures do not 
allow coaches to emphasize sport specialization before age 11 and forbid them to 
mandate year-around participation at any age.
196  Torres and Hager
The objective of youth sport reforms such as NAYS Standards 1 and 2 is to 
create sport experiences for children that are appropriate for their age and devel-
opmental level. Standard 2 itself urges parents to “select youth sport programs 
that are developed and organized to enhance the emotional, physical, social and 
educational well-being of children” (33). The rationale for Standard 2, as well 
as for Standard 1, emphasizes the maximization of meaningful participation for 
each child. Standard 2 in particular was developed and established in response 
to programs that overemphasized performance and winning. In the background 
statement for this standard, the NAYS notes that “many organized play experi-
ences for children are carbon copies of adult-oriented programs. The rules, skill 
expectations and competitive requirements are the same as in high school, college 
and professional levels” (33).1
The trend toward de-emphasizing or eliminating competitive elements within 
youth sport programs is part of an attempt to change the culture of youth sport by 
initiating a shift in the values that will prompt parents, coaches, and administrators to 
create organized sport experiences for children rather than for miniature adults. More 
adult-oriented youth sport programs tend to emphasize what Coakley has referred 
to as the “performance ethic.” He has contended that, within such programs, 
performance becomes a measured outcome and indicator of the quality of 
the sport experience. Fun in these programs comes to be defined in terms of 
becoming a better athlete, becoming more competitive, and being promoted 
into more highly skilled training categories. (7: p. 133)
Although the performance ethic might benefit a select group of talented young 
athletes, it does not meet the developmental needs of less skilled athletes who are 
participating in sport in order to learn how to play, acquire skills, be with friends, 
and have fun. Many young athletes in this second category burnout and leave 
sports because of parent- and coach-related factors associated with the performance 
ethic and its accompanying value system. According to Woods (37), coaches who 
contribute to youth sport burnout emphasize winning over skill acquisition and 
mastery and focus their energies on honing the skills of more talented athletes 
rather than helping those children whose skills are not as well developed. Parents 
also significantly contribute to burnout in young athletes by becoming too involved 
in their children’s sport participation, overemphasizing the importance of results, 
and “pushing children to the next level of competition even when they resist” (p. 
109).
Many youth sport programs, especially private ones that require parents to pay 
substantial fees for their child’s participation, foster the aforementioned damaging 
behaviors by subscribing to and promoting the performance ethic. As Coakley has 
pointed out, when parents shell out “big bucks” so their child can play a sport, they 
expect to get the kind of training and coaching that will lead to significant skill and 
performance improvements, as well as the benefits often identified with youth sport 
participation (e.g., fitness gains, social skill development, enjoyment, etc.). Some 
parents begin to view these payments as investments and expect to see substantial 
returns on them (7: p. 133). Although other benefits are visible to parents, they are 
not as celebrated and obvious as improvements in their child’s sport skills that can 
be quantified in statistics and the competitive success of the team for which he or 
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she plays. Hence, many parents wind up stressing the performance ethic and pres-
suring coaches, who are already inclined to subscribe to it, to further accentuate 
its concomitant values.
In acting on behalf of young athletes whose best interests are not being 
accounted for in adult-oriented programs, the proponents have sought to de-
emphasize the performance ethic by reducing the emphasis placed on winning, 
performance, and competition and highlighting values such as fun, skill acquisi-
tion and mastery, fairness, and sportspersonship. They believe that by decreasing 
the emphasis on the aspects of sports that influence adults and children to become 
competitive, or by eliminating some of these aspects altogether, they will be able 
to legislate this value shift and alter the culture of youth sport by requiring parents, 
coaches, and administrators to focus on the well-being and development of all 
children rather than the skill development and performance of the most athleti-
cally talented ones.
To sum up, the proponents of the trend believe that the competitive aspects 
of sport are leading those who oversee programs and children to overemphasize 
winning and athletic performance. To alleviate this problem, they contend that it 
is necessary to de-emphasize or abolish competitive practices in youth sport pro-
grams, including the development of competitive teams and the tabulation of scores 
and standings. The proponents argue that such practices should be removed from 
youth sport because they focus adults and children too intensely on children’s sport 
performance and competitive achievements and veil the importance of children’s 
skill acquisition, value learning, and emotional and psychological development. 
The trend, they conclude, is necessary because it facilitates the reprioritization of 
the skewed value systems of many youth sport programs and reestablishes the best 
interest of children as first priority. With the proponents’ view established, it is now 
appropriate to examine it in relation to the two most common representations of 
the central purpose and value of competitive sport to determine whether or not it 
stands on solid philosophic ground.
2
One of the most debated issues in modern sporting cultures across the world 
is whether the outcomes of sport contests or the way in which they are established 
prove the competitive merit and success of contestants. For example, in Argentine 
football followers of Carlos S. Bilardo, coach of the victorious Argentine side in 
the 1986 World Cup, believe that winning is the only measure of success. On the 
other hand, the likes of César L. Menotti, who coached Argentina to victory in the 
1978 World Cup, emphasize that how the game is played is of utmost importance 
(1: pp. 174–176; 2: pp. 52–58; 15: pp. 173–175). In the United States, Vince 
Lombardi and John Wooden characterized the tendencies embodied by Bilardo 
and Menotti, respectively. In turn, youth sport has adopted and reproduced these 
conflicting views of competitive success. The tendencies emphasizing either the 
product of sport contests or the process by which they are determined disclose 
not only a persistent fascination with competitive sport but also a fundamental 
tension between the two most common representations of its central purpose and 
meaning. One is the zero-sum view, the other is the mutualist view. In addition to 
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being defended by many sportspeople, these contradicting views have also been 
articulated in the sport philosophy literature.
The zero-sum view of competitive sport asserts that the achievement of victory 
by one side in contests necessarily precludes the other from such achievement. 
Because both sides in contests cannot logically win, contests are perceived as 
either–or affairs. That is, contests are constructed as rigid phenomena governed 
by a binary win–lose logic in which one’s victory becomes another’s loss. Thus, 
under the zero-sum view, the structure of competition, which pits one side against 
the other, disconnects contestants more than it unites them. In this respect, Simon 
(31) has observed that competition “can be thought of as participation in sports 
contests with the intent or major goal of defeating an opponent” (p. 18). On this 
account, opponents are at best means to one’s own ends, and at worst obstacles 
to be surmounted. This highlights what Hyland (16) has called “the moment of 
negativity” in sport, wherein in order to win “I must negate the efforts of the other 
player or team” (p. 179). Because outcomes make known who was on each side 
of the competitive winning–losing divide, they are inevitably, and forcefully, 
highlighted. In short, for the zero-sum view, competitive sport’s central purpose 
exclusively focuses on determining winners and losers.
Unlike the minimalist zero-sum view, the mutualist view does not understand 
the telos of competitive sport to be an either–or affair. Although it recognizes the 
zero-sum qualities of contests, the mutualist view stresses the overriding concern 
for excellence and the cooperative structure inherent in them. Several sport phi-
losophers (10;13;21;27;31) have argued that the core purpose of competitive sport 
is to compare the relative abilities of contestants to determine athletic superiority. 
The comparative purpose of contests inextricably binds contestants together, not 
only because a comparison necessitates more than one side but also because con-
testants challenge each other and attempt to overcome the challenge in a manner 
superior to that of their opponents. In this dialectic, contests become sites in which 
contestants fuse into a collective that strives to achieve excellence. Simon (31) 
has summarized this view, arguing that “competition presupposes a cooperative 
effort by competitors to generate the best possible challenge to each other” and 
that competitive sport is better understood as “a mutually acceptable quest for 
excellence through challenge” (p. 27). For the mutualist view, opponents recipro-
cally cooperate to catalyze their efforts toward excellence and determine athletic 
superiority—the conspicuous telos of competitive sport. Because both winners 
and losers can display excellence in a contest, sport competition is a non-zero-sum 
game, according to the mutualist view.
Torres and McLaughlin (36) have developed a characterization of contestants’ 
appreciation of sport competition that captures the divergent approaches advanced 
by the zero-sum and the mutualist views of its central purpose. They have discerned 
between “outcome seekers” and “resolution seekers.” Although both types of 
contestants are seduced by the basic project of a given sport as delineated by its 
rules and defining skills, the former find the zero-sum qualities of contests even more 
attractive. Outcome seekers’ fascination with the dyadic structure of competitive 
sport prompts them into a pursuit of auspicious results that entices them to dismiss 
concerns with the athletic merit and quality of play that led to those results. Because 
their measure of athletic success is first and foremost winning, outcome seekers 
either do not appreciate or fall short of embodying the significant role that excellence 
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and its cooperative dimension play in competitive sport. That is, “it is very likely 
that an outcome seeker would make a project out of winning, rather than a project 
out of sharing a test” (p. 149).
Conversely, resolution seekers are deeply concerned about how athletic chal-
lenges are met and legitimate comparisons are established. Because they “take 
seriously what it means to win,” resolution seekers “comprehend the important role 
that the opponents play in making winning not only possible but also meaningful” 
(36: p. 149). Their attitude clearly resembles the mutualist view of competitive 
sports and its proposed values. Resolution seekers care deeply about how sports 
are played; they inevitably embrace contests as sites in which athletic excellence 
is manifested through the opponents’ mutual efforts to meet their challenge while 
solving their sport’s rule-established and regulated project. In other words, reso-
lution seekers “do not appreciate victory for its own sake but as a reflection of a 
process by which contestants find worthy opponents, agree to create the best pos-
sible test, and attempt to overcome the challenge faced” (36: p. 149). Under this 
view, the primary commitment is to cultivating the defining skills of a sport and 
embracing those who are devoted to their advancement. In relation to Hyland’s 
(16) ideas, resolution seekers supersede the attempt to win in the search for excel-
lence and friendship.
Regardless of whether the zero-sum view or the mutualist view of competi-
tive sport and their respective characterizations by outcome seekers and resolution 
seekers is to be preferred, they have to be analyzed in relation to our thesis that the 
trend is not only unwarranted but also misleading to children. As it will become 
clear later, it is unwarranted because children are not competing, and it is misleading 
because children are being led to think that they are partaking in a type of activity 
(i.e., competitive sport) in which they are not.
Let us first consider the trend vis-à-vis the zero-sum view. Among its recom-
mendations, the trend calls for the elimination of scorekeeping at younger levels 
of youth sport. Its goal is to de-emphasize the winning–losing dyad. However, the 
zero-sum view and its outcome-seeking proponents would contend that unless scores 
are kept, it is unfeasible to establish outcomes, which in turn makes it unfeasible to 
determine winners and losers. This recommendation violates what they consider the 
basic principle and whole purpose of sport competition: defeating one’s opponent. 
How would one tell if the purpose of competitive sport was accomplished if scores 
were not kept and winners were not determined? For outcome seekers, athletic 
events in which no effort is made to keep track of the score and determine winners 
cannot be considered, properly speaking, instances of athletic competition.
It could be argued that in youth sport competition it is not necessary to keep 
scores to determine the outcomes of contests and discriminate winning sides from 
losing sides. Many contests at this level are so uneven that winners are easily recog-
nized in spite the absence of scores. It is, however, far from clear that scorekeeping 
is unnecessary at the younger levels of sport. Needless to say, it is an unproven 
empirical claim that winners and losers can be recognized without scores. More 
important, if establishing winners and losers is not in itself problematic and only 
scorekeeping is, those who propose the trend appear to contradict their initial 
goal of de-emphasizing contestants’ fascination with the zero-sum qualities of 
competition. What is the point of not keeping scores if winners will nevertheless 
be recognizable? If adherents of the trend retort that the winning–losing dyad has 
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little, if anything, to do with youth sports, they are straightforwardly corroborat-
ing that in this mode of organized sport, children are not engaged in a competitive 
activity. When analyzed under the light of the zero-sum view, the trend’s proposal 
to eliminate the keeping of scores either contradicts its own stated goal or it moves 
entirely away from its ideal of competition.
If the analytical structure of the trend does not hold up well against the chal-
lenges posed by the zero-sum view, it does not fare much better when contrasted 
with the mutualist view. Consider, once again, the trend’s proposal to eliminate 
scorekeeping. This elimination takes away an important indicator of the relative 
skills of contestants. Although imperfect tools for measuring and comparing ath-
letic excellence, scores unveil consequential comparative information. This is even 
more true when contestants possess relatively similar levels of skills. For instance, 
Simon (31) has argued that winning is certainly “an important criterion, sometimes 
the criterion, of having met the challenge of the opposition” (p. 36). Although he 
acknowledges that it sometimes inaccurately portrays athletic superiority, Dixon 
(10) has concurred that “regarding winning as the criterion for athletic superiority 
is, qua operational definition, irreproachable” (p. 18). Referring to the complexity 
and difficulty of assessing athletic performance, Torres and Hager (35) have pro-
posed principles that “help in designing and implementing evaluation systems that 
more accurately reflect and reward performance” (p. 209). If evaluation systems 
are capable of justly rewarding athletic excellence and the end results of contests 
are good indicators of the excellence displayed by contestants in the process that 
established them, the elimination of scores seems unjustifiable. Indeed, it might 
unnecessarily obscure—or simply make impossible—the determination of the 
athletically superior side which, according to the mutualist view and resolution 
seekers, is the most important goal of athletic contests.
Recommendations by the proponents of the trend to discourage the formation 
of regular competitive teams and ensure minimal playing time for all young athletes 
also detract from the ideal of competitive sport advocated by the mutualist view and 
resolution seekers. Entitling each and every young athlete to some minimal playing 
opportunities simply because he or she desires it goes against notions of excellence 
and merit. This strategy to promote participation for all undermines the cooperative 
element in sport contests, what Kretchmar (21) has called the move from test to 
contest, because it disregards the agreement that contestants challenge each other 
to the best of their abilities. An objection might be raised that once on the playing 
field each young athlete puts forth his or her maximal effort. However, in team 
sports it is the combination of individual athletes’ efforts that produces a unified 
and maximal challenge to the opponent. “In fact,” as Kretchmar (19) has argued, 
“this is why we conceptualize these activities as team tests and team contests” (p. 
269). If no performative or strategic reason justifies playing an inferior athlete, the 
mutual testing in search for excellence is subverted. Here, it is not the technical or 
strategic versatility of a team to excel in its sport’s challenge that prevails but the 
commitment to play every athlete regardless of athletic merit or need—a principle 
that both denies the logic of competitive sport and the old axiom of always playing 
one’s best. With language resembling the mutualist view, Delattre (9) has defended 
the notion that athletic success requires being and finding worthy contestants. Play-
ing everybody does not ensure this and even jeopardizes the validity and meaning 
of contests’ comparison of skill.2
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Emphasizing involvement among all participants unnecessarily reproduces a 
tension frequently confronted by sportspeople: sport competition is presented as 
being about either participation or winning. In other words, the process of con-
testing is pitted against its end result. Torres (34) has analyzed this dichotomy as 
found in Olympic ideology. For him, the Olympic motto’s and Olympic creed’s 
respective emphasis on the results of contests and participation distort the nuanced 
subtlety and intricacy of competitive sport.3 Torres has argued that this is a false 
dichotomy and that, when an approach similar to the mutualist view is incorporated 
into the analysis, results and the process of contesting come to form an intrinsi-
cally meaningful whole. “This whole, this interconnectedness between one’s own 
and one’s opponents’ performances, that entails the complexity and nuances of 
sport competition, is what makes it a project worth pursuing” (p. 251). The trend’s 
dichotomization of sport competition into an either–or affair impedes the theoretical 
understanding and, perhaps more importantly, the actual embodiment of this radical 
reconciliation. Because it focuses on participation to the detriment of results, the 
trend misrepresents the uniqueness of sport competition.
In summary, the recommendations proposed by the trend and its underlying 
ideas distort and depart from the notion of sport competition represented by the 
zero-sum view and the mutualist view. Considered under the “winning is everything” 
attitude defended by the former, the trend appears to contradict its overall purpose. 
However, it is possible to argue that it entirely neglects the idea of competition. If 
scores are not kept, the goal of competitive sport is simply not pursued. Similarly, 
when the trend’s proposals are evaluated with the more encompassing mutualist 
view of competitive sport, they also encounter intractable challenges. First, the 
elimination of scores removes an important measure for determining athletic excel-
lence and superiority. Second, discouraging the formation of regular competitive 
teams and ensuring minimal playing time for all young athletes undermines one 
of the conditions of the move from test to contest, which requires that contestants 
challenge each other to the best of their abilities in the quest for athletic excellence. 
So, arguably, the goal of competitive sport is not pursued here either. Finally, the 
emphasis on participation at the expense of outcomes misrepresents the complexity 
and nuances of competitive sport.
3
Let us be clear that our analysis of the trend and its recommendations in rela-
tion to the zero-sum and mutualist views’ constructions of the central purpose of 
competitive sport does not commit us to defending a “win-at-all-costs” approach to 
organized youth sport or a conception that puts competitive sport before children’s 
interests and needs. Our claim is that the trend misrepresents and departs from 
both minimalist and more nuanced interpretations of competition in sport. That 
is, in its attempts to de-emphasize competition, the trend neglects it altogether. 
Unfortunately, the noble intentions of the trend and its proponents are not only 
unwarranted and misleading to children but they also fail to serve children’s inter-
ests and needs.4
At this point it is instructive to briefly explore those interests and needs. Scha-
piro (29), using a Kantian theoretical framework, has argued that “the condition 
202  Torres and Hager
of childhood is one in which the agent is not yet in a position to speak in her own 
voice because there is no voice which counts as hers” (p. 729). For this philoso-
pher, childhood is a normative predicament that excuses paternalistic attitudes 
toward children insofar as the will that would permit authority over them is not yet 
developed.5 While recognizing how formidable this predicament is for children, 
Schapiro has proposed that adults should help children come out of childhood, 
keeping in mind that it is only they who can do so. The task of children “is to carve 
out a space between themselves and the forces within them. They are to do this by 
trying on principles in the hope of developing a perspective they can endorse as 
their own” (p. 735). In other words, children have to find a voice they can endorse 
as legitimately theirs. To help children accomplish this, adults must recognize both 
negative and positive obligations to them:
Our negative obligation as adults must be to refrain from hindering them 
[children] in this effort [of developing a perspective they can endorse as their 
own]. We do this by not treating children as if they belonged to a distinct and 
permanent underclass. . . .
The second part of the principle, which prohibits us from treating children as a 
permanent underclass, determines both positive and negative duties. Negatively, 
it implies that we must refrain from acting in ways which hinder children’s 
development as deliberators. . . . Positively, the principle demands that we make 
it our end to help children overcome their dependent condition. In nurturing, 
disciplining, and educating children, we must strive as far as possible to make 
them aware of their natural authority and power over themselves and of its 
proper exercise. (29: pp. 735–736)
Schapiro (29) has maintained that these obligations, intended to facilitate 
children’s quest to find and develop their own place in the world and personal set 
of convictions, “all stem from the idea that in order not to abuse our privilege as 
adults, we must make children’s dependence our enemy” (p. 737). She has called 
this “a principle of Kantian nonideal theory. In the spirit of [John] Rawls’s noni-
deal theory, this principle helps us to find the least immoral way of coping with an 
obstacle to morality” (p. 737).
In light of Schapiro’s understanding of childhood and proposed ethic of 
adult–child relations, we question whether the trend’s misrepresentation of competi-
tive sport is suited to help children work their way out of childhood and become 
autonomous beings. The trend’s proponents are misleading children by telling 
them that they are engaged in competition when they clearly are not. This implies 
either conceptual confusion or a disregard for the truth, both of which appear to 
contradict adults’ obligation to help children develop into independent and educated 
deliberators. Conceptual confusion about the central purpose of competitive sport 
might lead children to unwarranted conclusions, beliefs, and attitudes regarding a 
social practice with enormous significance and value in contemporary life. It is no 
different than telling children that they can ride a bicycle without wheels or that 
hopscotch and dodgeball are games but not sports.6 Of course children, appeal-
ing to their empirical sensitivity, will disprove in no time the assertion about the 
wheel-less bicycle. However, they will have a more difficult time finding a way 
out of the analytical confusion surrounding the underlying notions of games and 
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sports in the hopscotch and dodgeball example. Conceptually misleading children 
in this way, whether done purposely or not, is unacceptable. Indeed, if children are 
to free themselves from ignorance and progressively take charge of their lives, the 
information transmitted, as well as the methods taught during childhood to make 
sense of that information and the world in which they live, should be accurate and 
reliable. Using Schapiro’s terminology, it is difficult to comprehend how analyti-
cal confusion is a morally justifiable way to cope with an obstacle to sound moral 
deliberation (i.e., children’s immaturity). How can children become independent 
in the world of sports if they are mystified about competitive sport’s nature and 
central purpose?7
Furthermore, eliminating competition from competitive sport not only amounts 
to conceptual confusion, it transforms organized youth sport into a “practical cha-
rade” in which adults and children pretend the latter are participating in competitive 
activities when they are not. Although many children will simply play their roles 
as athletes in this charade, others will immediately recognize the contrast between 
their noncompetitive activities and the similar but highly competitive sports they see 
when attending elite events or watching them on television. The clear differences 
between two activities bearing the same name can only serve to confuse these bright 
children and make them question both the truth of their parents’ claims that they 
are playing competitive soccer, for example, and the validity of their own experi-
ence of the sport of soccer. This being so, the charade facilitated by the trend will 
not help children make sense of their sporting experiences and, therefore, will not 
assist them in their efforts toward autonomy.
If the issue is disregard for the truth, the disservice to children could be even 
worse. For it seems that at the center of an independent life is a concern for truth. 
As Frankfurt (14) has forcefully put it, “without truth we have no opinion at all 
concerning how things are or our opinion is wrong” (p. 59). Although ignorance and 
false beliefs might make people “for a time, blissfully ignorant or happily deceived 
and . . . we may temporarily avoid being especially upset or disturbed,” Frankfurt is 
convinced that, in the end, they “are likely just to make our circumstances worse” 
(p. 60). Lack of knowledge and falsehood leave people, especially children, not 
only disoriented but also with a distorted sense of reality and their capabilities and 
opportunities. These are hardly empowering qualities. In this regard, Savater (28: p. 
119) has said that trusting ignorance is both absurd and dangerous. It is dangerous 
because while capitulating to error and misconception, it denies the liberating role 
of human reason and leaves people in the dark. It is absurd because it neglects the 
obvious power of knowledge to help people enrich their lives.
It might be argued that the trend and its recommendations are justified because 
they protect children from experiences that might hurt them. Their proponents 
would argue that the costs associated with participation in organized youth sport 
outweigh the benefits. More importantly, they would argue that the reality of com-
petitive sport is plagued with undesirable behavior and demoralizing effects. After 
all, adults have a duty to protect children from unnecessary traumatic or unpleasant 
experiences that would hinder the development of their autonomy. Some realities 
are so discouraging, unsettling, and counterproductive that children are better off 
being protected from them.
First, it is questionable whether competitive sport causes, or even correlates to, 
negative alterations in a young athlete’s quest to become his or her own authority, 
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both in the sport arena and life in general. This is something that has to be empirically 
demonstrated. Moreover, it appears that some young athletes greatly benefit from 
competition in sport, whether it teaches desirable traits or merely reinforces them. 
Second, it might be argued that eliminating competitive sport from a young athlete’s 
life takes away valuable, if sometimes difficult and painful, experiences from such 
a crucial quest. Third, as Frankfurt (14) has argued, knowing and confronting harsh 
realities is more beneficial than being oblivious to them. In his judgment,
it is nearly always more advantageous to face the facts with which we must 
deal than to remain ignorant of them. After all, hiding our eyes from reality 
will not cause any reduction of its dangers and threats; plus, our chances of 
dealing successfully with the hazards that it presents will surely be greater if 
we can bring ourselves to see things straight. (p. 58)
How can children deliberate autonomously about the value—and risks—of 
sport competition if the competitive qualities have been eliminated from their 
sports experience but the endeavor is still labeled as such? Conceptually misled, 
children might have a hard time understanding the divorce between the highly 
visible kinds of sport competitions they are exposed to in their everyday life and 
their own “competitive yet noncompetitive” experiences. Misleading children also 
underestimates their growing agency and could potentially end in the dismissal of 
their explicit, and sometimes legitimate, preferences.8 Adults’ obligation to facilitate 
children’s autonomy demands conceptual clarity. It might well be that some degree 
of paternalism is justifiable in early stages of organized youth sport. However, this 
does not merit confusing children. Calling things by their name only helps children 
overcome the predicament of childhood. Organized youth sport might need reform 
to assist children in their formidable task of finding their way in the world, but it 
should not further confuse their initial sport experiences by telling them they are 
doing something they are not.
The trend and its recommendations for reforms are rooted in the idea that 
competition is inherently to blame for the strong emphasis on the performance 
ethic and on winning in youth sport. Its proponents believe that competition itself 
is responsible for bringing out the worst in parents, coaches, and young athletes; 
it influences them to act unethically toward others, and, in the case of parents and 
coaches, it places undue psychological and emotional pressures on children play-
ing sports. If it were true that competition pushed individuals and groups to act 
unethically in pursuit of victory, then de-emphasizing the competitive aspects of 
youth sport activities and programs would make sense. We would argue, however, 
that it is not competition per se that is responsible for the moral breakdowns in 
youth sport or the excessive pressure adults place on young athletes to perform up 
to potential. It is, rather, people’s attitudes toward competition—their understanding 
of the central purpose of competitive sport, of how one should compete, of what 
is permissible in competitive settings, and of the value of winning in sport—that 
is the basis of these problems.
Although this point might appear to be philosophic slight-of-hand, it is not. 
For if it is people’s attitudes toward competition that are problematic and not com-
petition itself, then what is called for is a shift in those attitudes, not a removal of 
the competitive aspects of youth sport. Failure to recognize this point has led the 
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proponents and their followers down the wrong path. By placing the blame squarely 
on the shoulders of competition rather than on people’s ideas about what competi-
tion is, reformers have made it seem as if youth sport programmers can make their 
problems vanish by eliminating competition. Such a characterization is a gross 
misrepresentation of the situation youth sport programs are facing; moreover, it is 
leading coaches, parents, and administrators to overlook the benefits that might be 
gained from maintaining the competitive aspects of youth sport.
In order to create and integrate right-headed reforms into youth sport programs 
and contexts, we must be willing to be truthful with ourselves and our children. 
We must recognize that, in general, a flawed conception of competition is driving 
our ideas about how we should compete with others. This negative view of com-
petition was summed up by Shields (30) in his portrayal of the “decompetitor.” 
Decompetitors are those who see competition as an opportunity to pursue victory 
by dominating and humiliating opponents. They view sport as a war or battle, 
their opponents as enemies or at least obstacles to their success, and winning as 
survival. Such individuals show minimal respect for their sport, viewing its rules 
as “restraints” to be tolerated and, if necessary, broken in pursuit of advantage 
(30: pp. 3–4). Shields’s decompetitors share some characteristics with Torres and 
McLaughlin’s (36) outcome seekers, as both understandings take competition to 
be a zero-sum game.
If all instances of competition were instances of decompetition or if there 
were no alternative approaches to the zero-sum view of competitive sport, then the 
proponents’ efforts to subtract competitive aspects from sport would certainly be 
warranted. However, not all forms of competition are negative. Shields has noted 
this fact in contrasting his decompetitor with the good competitor or “competitor.” 
Much like Torres and McLaughlin’s (36) resolution seekers, competitors view sport 
as a partnership with the objectives of skill mastery and excellence. On this view, 
opponents are enablers who help achieve these goals by presenting each other with 
the strongest possible challenge, and rules are respected as “imperfect guides to 
fairness” that create the unique tests that are competitive sports (30: pp. 3–4).
This dichotomy drives home the points that competition does not have to 
be negative and damaging to children and that it is possible to have enriching 
competition through which children could learn important values and lessons. It 
is the positive forms of competition that we need to begin to stress to youth sport 
participants so that they will have a more enlightened view of competing—one 
that emphasizes excellence through “striving together” rather than winning through 
subjugation. Such a view would resemble the mutualist view expounded earlier 
and is one that could be endorsed by youth sport programs.9
In order for positive forms of competition to flourish, however, adults as 
well as children need to learn what it means to compete in a good and decent 
manner. For many coaches and parents this will mean relearning what competi-
tion is by recognizing the shortcomings of their current decompetitive, zero-sum 
understanding of sport, and integrating more nuanced and constructive ideas of 
what competition can be into their views. It is only by doing this kind of work that 
adults themselves will be able to teach young athletes to compete well. This will, 
hopefully, allow children to begin to experience youth sport differently by reduc-
ing the stress and anxiety they experience when participating and allowing them 
to have fun while focusing on acquiring sport skills and learning values such as 
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fair play, sportspersonship, and teamwork. Furthermore, if sport is maintained as 
a competitive venture, young athletes will have the opportunity to learn relevant 
contesting skills, such as those noted by Kretchmar (20: p. 134), in addition to the 
particular testing skills of a sport. These might include learning how to play with a 
lead, how to come from behind, how to compete well in close contests, and when 
to take strategic risks.
By changing the way competitive sport is viewed rather than deleting competi-
tive aspects from it, the problems challenging youth sport programs are directly 
addressed. If competitive elements are simply removed from youth sport, the 
primary problem remains: people are confused about competitive sport’s central 
purpose and meaning and lack the knowledge of how to compete decently with 
one another in sport settings. Slowly phasing competition back into sport at later 
ages will do nothing to solve this problem, as children will eventually learn a more 
decompetitive, zero-sum view of sport from coaches and parents anyway. By stress-
ing the complexity of mutualist forms of competition at earlier ages, it might be 
possible to improve not only the culture of youth sport but those of higher levels 
of sport as well because those competing at these levels will see sport competition 
as something other than simply a “win first” venture. Children and adults with 
a mutualist view of competitive sport will be more likely to carry this healthier 
approach with them to more advanced levels of sport and to begin to affect the 
manner in which sport is contested at these levels.
It should be clear that the trend, on the other hand, fails to deal with the 
causes of unethical competition, because it does not focus on enlightening children 
and adults about the intricacy and richness of sport competition. In addition, by 
de-emphasizing competition in organized youth sport rather than attempting to 
improve it, the trend and its proponents decline to confront those who subscribe 
to the zero-sum view of competitive sport regarding the problems their approach 
brings. In doing so, the proponents are, in effect, conceding more advanced and 
elite levels of sport to decompetitors and outcome seekers. Reforms that start by 
setting limitations on sport competition implicitly agree that prevailing zero-sum 
attitudes are so ingrained in sport cultures that they cannot be questioned or chal-
lenged. There is no justification to give so much power and credibility to those who 
believe competitive sport is an either–or affair in which the winner takes all and 
the loser gets nothing but despair. It is a defeatist worldview, unsuitable, and even 
unpalatable, for people who believe in the power of education, open dialogue, and 
progressive social change. We are not willing to adopt such a worldview and believe 
that informing youth sport with the mutualist view will aid in the development of 
resolution seekers, competitors who will improve the moral welfare of sport at both 
younger and more advanced levels of competition.
4
Childhood is a period of life filled with learning, change, and challenges, all 
of which influence the development and identity of children. Those who participate 
in organized youth sport programs experience a variety of challenges as they learn 
the skills, strategies, norms, and values associated with their sport. During this 
process, some disappointment is inevitable; for no child will get a hit every time 
she steps to the plate or score every time he shoots the ball. Sports are sites of risk 
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and uncertainty, and all children will experience this fact as they take part in them. 
Two of the uncertainties of sport are those related to competitive performance and 
outcome. When young athletes “take the field,” there are no guarantees that they 
will play up to their potential or achieve victory. If, as adults, we are willing to 
let them risk the disappointment that accompanies poor performance, why are we 
hesitant to let them risk and experience losing?
In this essay we have demonstrated why we believe it is wrongheaded and 
counterproductive to deny children an authentic sport experience by removing 
competitive elements from youth sport programs. This practice is endorsed by 
neither the minimalist zero-sum nor the more complex mutualist views of sport 
competition, because it misleads children regarding the central purpose and meaning 
of competitive sport. Furthermore, this deception is unwarranted and unacceptable 
given that childhood is a normative predicament that requires battling naivety and 
ignorance to develop autonomy. Finally, we do not deny the need to reform organized 
youth sport programs, but recommend that such reforms focus on changing adults’ 
“win-first” conceptions of competition. By reeducating parents and coaches about 
the best interpretation of competition and what it can and should be, sport scholars 
can help them develop the more constructive outlook of Torres and McLaughlin’s 
(36) resolution seeker or of Shield’s (30) good competitor, which they, in turn, can 
pass on to young athletes in lieu of misleading them by eliminating competitive 
aspects of youth sport programs.
In this way, children will hopefully learn to compete in a good and decent 
manner at an earlier age and will benefit from not being deluded about competitive 
sport’s central purpose. Simultaneously, adults will learn to alter their damaging, 
decompetitive, zero-sum views of sport competition, stop overemphasizing win-
ning and the performance ethic, and maintain their honesty in the process. In turn, 
this honesty will help children in the difficult task of coming out of the immature 
condition of childhood. Respecting children count on adults for such assistance; 
they deserve nothing less. 
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Notes
1. Whether the NAYS’s claim that many organized youth sport’s experiences are “carbon copies” 
of adult activities is true and justified or unsubstantiated and exaggerated, it is an important ele-
ment of its explicit discourse and rationale for the trend. The purpose here is to merely cite the 
NAYS’s position to illustrate the construction of the trend. True, the fact that most sports adjust 
their rules extensively according to children’s developmental levels does partially erase images 
of organized youth sport as a carbon copy of organized adult sport. However, perhaps what the 
NAYS stresses is that the overemphasis of winning and performance seems to be prevalent in 
both youth and adult versions of organized sport.
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2. Ensuring minimal playing time for all young athletes might be important to encourage 
physical activity for the sake of health, to promote life-long interest in sport, or to develop social 
ties, among other reasons. None of these considerations undermines the idea that playing athletes 
regardless of athletic merit or need denies the mutualist view’s logic of competitive sport. This 
does not mean that health, life-long interest in sport, or social ties should not be considered when 
developing policy for organized youth sport. Indeed, these elements might suggest the need to 
distribute playing time among all young athletes. However, it is important to highlight that the 
more considerations such as health or socialization take precedence over the concern for the mutual 
construction of excellence, merit, or the formation of testing families (21), the less important 
competitive sport and what it expresses become.
3. The Olympic motto reads “Citius, altius, fortius” (faster, higher, stronger; 17: p. 18). The 
Olympic creed proposes that in the Olympic Games, “the important thing is not winning, but 
taking part” and it emphasizes that “what counts in life is not the victory, but the struggle; the 
essential thing is not to conquer, but to fight well” (8: p. 589).
4. Although not advanced by proponents of the trend, the argument could be made that another 
reason for trying to eliminate or reduce competition at younger ages resides in children’s contem-
porary lives, which often have modest amounts of unstructured time and include more competitive 
endeavors than in the past. Given this situation, the elimination or reduction of competition could 
be seen as a way to introduce more noncompetitive, spontaneous experiences into childhood. If 
experiences with these characteristics are important for children’s development, they should be 
provided. However, expunging competition from organized youth sports does not provide children 
with such experiences, because noncompetitive youth sports remain complex, highly structured, 
and rule-governed activities.
5. To affirm that childhood is a normative predicament that allows for paternalism until children 
have authority over themselves does not mean that what they do is only intelligible or valuable in 
terms of their future adult condition. The ability of children to produce genuine art, music, and 
sport skills, as well as to engage in philosophical reasoning, could be seen as having intrinsic 
value. For works exploring children’s capacities in some of these domains see, for example, 
Fineberg (12), and Matthews (23; 24). 
6. For an influential discussion on the nature of games and sports and their relationship, see 
Meier (25).
7. One can argue that withholding information from children is acceptable if it facilitates 
children’s path to autonomy. This is a reasonable paternalist position and we presume Schapiro 
would agree with it. However, there seems to be a difference between withholding information 
from children and conceptually misleading them. Perhaps, as pedagogy suggests, when concepts, 
ideas, or theories are so complex that children are presumably unable to immediately make 
sense of them, it is appropriate to simplify and adapt them to children’s developmental level for 
introductory purposes. Yet, once again, this process seems to have little to do with conceptual 
confusion and a lot to do with conceptual clarification and comprehension.
8. There is a growing body of literature arguing that children’s expressed preferences should be 
considered when taking decisions that affect them. This, of course, does not mean that children’s 
preferences should be the overriding factor, or that other relevant considerations, including those 
that might contradict children’s preferences, should not be taken into account. See, for example, 
Bluebond-Langner (3), Blustein (5), Blustein, Levine, and Dubler (4), and Kopelman and Moskop 
(18). In terms of children’s agency, as suggested in Note 5, children are capable of producing 
and enjoying aesthetically valuable art and music, poignant philosophy, and interesting sport 
performances. This is an admittedly short list of what children are capable of doing. There are 
countless examples of children who successfully participate in activities typically constructed as 
belonging to the world of adults. For instance, a recent article published in the New York Times 
tells the story of a child whose entrepreneurial skills have helped him start several sport-related 
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businesses. The child hopes to study business at Princeton University. While his father is “proud 
of Dustin and everything he has accomplished at such a young age,” the article’s author considers 
that “By the time he takes the SAT, he will have an M.B.A.’s worth of experience” (22).
9. As Simon (32) has noted, mutualist views such as ones proposed by broad internalists can 
help keep winning in perspective and presuppose “a commitment to such values as fairness, 
liberty, and equality” (p. 19).
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